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Preface
This is a day when the emotional aspect of ex-
perience is depreciated in value by the vast majority of
students in the field of religion. The two predominant
approaches to religion make such depreciation almost in-
evitable. The philosophical approach has a tendency to
be intellectualistio and hence, lays stress upon reason
and interpretation as opposed to affect. The scientific
approach, though it has given the emotions more consider-
ation than has philosophy, seems to have concluded that
they are vascillating and nebulous in nature and are not
to be taken seriously. Any thing which does not fit into
certain fixed forms and hence, is difficult to classify,
is soon discarded by soience even though such proceedure
is not scientific.
Believing, then, that the feeling aspect of
life was not being studied exhaustively enough, especially
in its relation to religion, we have gone through the
field and present our findings in the body of this paper.
It has been our purpose to scientifically study the bio-
logical backgroung of the emotions and to relate them to
various phases of the religious experience with a view
toward determining their ultimate value.

Part I
The Emotions
Their Psychological and Physiological Background
t
Chapter I
Psychology
The Phenomena Termed Emotional
The I, or consoious, individual, human self
is not only a cognitive being. We have not exhausted
its possibilities when we say that it perceives, im-
agines, recognizes and thinks.^" Neither have we ac-
counted for all of its manifestations and reactions.
If we add that the I oontains volitional elements or
that in its very nature it is volition and self-activa-
ting power, we have broadened its scope but have not yet
reached its ultimate limits. Layman and scientist alike
recognize still another function of the self. It thinks
and wills but it also feels . It loves, hates, enjoys.
It is sorrowful, amused, disgusted or curious. It is
afraid or it is angry, pleased or displeased. In other
words, there is an affective or feeling element involved
which is very important and which plays a very large
place in self-experience. This affective element has
3been termed emotion. Tffoodworth calls it the, "stirred-
up-ness present in a state of mind," and goes on to
point out that this emotional part of the total state
(which contains cognitive elements also) may be so strong
as to overshadow all other components or it may have less
intensity down to zero.
1. I p. 180
3. XXVII p. 118
t
It is readily seen that the term emotion, used
in this fashion has both a wide longitude and latitude.
The emotions or affective elements may be very feeble, as
would be the case in mild curiosity, or they may be very
intense as in great fear. They may be very simple and
elementary, as in anger, or they may be very complex as
would be so when intellectual, moral, or spititual ex-
periences were arousing them.
In spite of this very evident width of scope
many attempts have been made to reduce the emotions and
feelings to simple basic elements. Traditionally the
basic elements have been accepted as pleasantness and un-
pleasantness. Love, hate, sorrow, amusement, etc., are
all subsumed under these elementary feeling experiences.
The two terms are held to be irreducable. They must be
experienced if understood. They are ultimate. The
same notion has been expressed in a more ambiguous way
by using the terms pleasure and pain. There is a dan-
ger that these latter terms may be misleading. This be-
cause they tend to confuse the emotions with sensations
which have similar qualities and yet should not be iden-
tified with the affective aspect of experience. There
is a very distinct difference between pleasant and un-
pleasant sensations and pleasant and unpleasant emotions.
Sensations are localized in some particular region of
the body while emotions are all of "us". If we have the
emotion of anger we are, "mad all over", not in any lo-
calized area.^" Again sensations are readily picked out
1. XXVII p. 130

and observed while emotions grow vague under introspec-
tion and in most cases are dispelled. Finally, emotions
have no known sense organs as is the case with sensations.
Thus, it is seen that unless sensations and emotions are
differentiated, there is serious objection to using the
terms pleasure and pain in both cases. When dealing with
the emotions, however, the terms pleasant and unpleasant
are to be preferred.
An objection to the above classification (name-
ly, that it is not exhaustive in accounting for the ele-
ments of emotion) has been pressed and is not easily
met. James' attack on the terms pleasure and pain which
are used synonymously with pleasantness and unpleasant-
ness is significant here. He says, "The essence of emo-
tion is pleasure and pain. This is a hackneyed psycho-
logical doctrine, but on any theory of the seat of emo-
tions it seems to me one of the m03t artificial and
scholastic of the untruths that disfigure our science.
One might as well say that the essence of prismatic
color is pleasure and pain. There are infinite shades
and tones in various emotional excitements which are dis-
tinct a3 sensations of color are, and of which one is
quite at a loss to predicate either pleasant or painful
quality.
"
1
Carrying out this idea Royce has held that the
emotions have two dimensions instead of one. These di-
mensions are pleasantness and unpleasantness and rest-
lessness and quiescence. Wundt has added what he calls
1. Quoted by XIV p. 42
t
still another dimension, excitement and calm. Others
have suggested that the feeling of correctness or of
being on the right track in an investigation cannot be
classed under the single division of pleasantness or un-
pleasantness. However, we can hardly say that these lat-
ter are pure emoti-ns. They are cognitive judgements,
though vague, and are secondarily emotional.
On the other hand, the suggestions of James
and Royce and Wundt must be considered. Is the emotional
life too complex to be blanketed under the pleasant-un-
pleasant classification? We do not think so. That it
is complex must not be denied. It has countless shades
and gradations and these must be recognized. But the
parallelism in the classifications of the three scholars
in question must also be noted. Pleasantness, quiescence
and calm, are all emotionally pleasant while unpleasant-
ness, restlessness and excitement are all emotionally
unpleasant. It is true, they manifest different degrees
of emoticnal reaction but they are basically either
pleasant or unpleasant to the organism. Probably we
will have to accept the pleasant-unpleasant classifica-
2
tion as being ultimate.
Having isolated the affective element in the
self and considered its possible basic components, we
may well ask, "How does emotional experience influence
the subject?" The mo3t obvious manifestation here is
the individualizing nature of emotion. Both the subject
1. XIII p. 501
3. See I p. 183f

and object of emotion are realized as unique or irre-
placeable. How this phenomenon differentiates affect
from perception and from all forms of thought for in
these no special stress is laid on the self as "ju3t
this individual" or on the object as being peculiarly
individual. Except in emotion one realizes that other
selves see and hear as he does and assumes that they
think as he does under similar circumstances. In emo-
tion, however, we immediately recognize ourselves as
unique. We find it difficult to believe there is any
other lover or hater in the same sense. In other words
we completely individualize ourselves in the affective
experience
.
So also we individualize the object of our
emotion. We hate a certain man, not men in general, and
feel we have reasons peculiar to ourselves for so hating.
Thus, when we are angry we are, "completely angry" and
at a certain individual or thing, the whole being an
intensely individual experience. It cannot be objecti-
fied easily as can other forms of mental life. It is
this individualizing nature of emotion, no doubt, which
prompts Mac Curdy, in his definition of affect, to lay
so much stress on the self. He says, "Affect is any
subjective experience that, when examined introspectively
,
is considered to originate in or belong to the subject 1 s
individual organism
.
(The underlining is mine). It
may be felt to be either mental or physical, to be stim-
ulated by sense perception, by a thought, or to be
causeless. But in no case is it thought to be a quality

of the stimulus, except in relation to the subject."
If it be suggested that crowd emotional reac-
tions may have the common to all nature, we do not yet
evade the fact that even here each individual considers
his emotions his own.
The above definition brings out a second chara-
cteristic of emotion as related to the self. Emotion is
receptive. In all affective experience we are conscious
of being affected by our environment though not directly
through end organs. The self somehow, creates the emo-
tion as a result of environmental influence. This is,
of course, similar to the experience of sensation and
perception with the exception that, as brought out above,
the environmental influence is indirect in the case of
affect, no end-organs are apparent.
Personal objects are not the only environmental
factors which evoke the human emotions. Impersanal ob-
jects often are responsible for some of the most pronoun-
ced affective states. Hence, there are what we might oall
social and non-social forms of emotion. The former type
elicited by personal contacts, the latter by impersonal
contacts. We might well reproduce here the chart of
emotional forms given by Miss Calkins.
SOCIAL EMOTIONS (With Personal Objects)
Egoistic, Unsympathetic Emotions
a. With other self as object: -
1. Happy (that is, pleasant) emotions: -
(a) Without valuation of other self:-
1. XIV p. 44

7Happiness, realized as due to other self, Liking
(b) With valuation:
-
Happiness, realized as due to other self,
Who is,
(1) Stronger than oneself, Reverence
(3) Equal to oneself, Love(?) Friendship(?)
(3) Weaker than oneself, Tenderness( ?)
2. Unhappy (that is, unpleasant) emotions:
-
(a) Without valuation:
-
Unhappiness, realized as due to other self, Dislike
(b) With valuation:
-
Unhappiness, realized as due to others,
Who are,
(1) Stronger than oneself, Terror
(2) Equal to oneself, Hate
(3) Weaker than onesilf, Scorn
b. With myself as valued object:-
1. As valued by myself,
(a) Happiness in myself, regarded as worthy, Pride
(b) Unhappiness in myself, regarded as unworthy ,Humility
2. As valued by others,
(a) Happiness in being admired, Vanity
(b) Unhappiness in being scorned, Shame
II. Altruistic, or Sympathetic Emotions
a. Homogeneous:
-
1. Happiness through shared happiness, Mitfreude
2. Unhappiness through shared unhappiness, Pity
b. Heterogeneous, or mixed:
-
1. Happiness through another^ unhappiness, Malice
2. Unhappiness through another's happiness, Envy

6NON-SOCIAL EMOTIONS (With Impersonal Objects)
Egoistic
a. Sensational,
b. Relational,
Like
Dislike
Ennui
Enjoyment of the Familiar
I. Altruistic (absorbing)
a. Sensational Aesthetic pleasure
b. Relational Logical pleasure
1
Sense of humor, etc.
This chart is, of course, not exhaustive but
gives some idea of the oomplex nature of emotion. An in-
teresting point here is the fact that an object which
causes a certain emotion in one individual may oause an
entirely different emotion in another individual. This
is easily illustrated at a football game when a score is
made. Half the crowd has pleasant emotions aroused, the
other half unpleasant. The highly individual nature of
emotion is thus, brought out again.
should be mentioned. We refer to its spontaneous or
automatic nature. Affective states seem to come without
effort on the part of the subject. He may have to force
himself to think or make a volition but no such pressure
is necessary to cause him to feel. The emotions seem to
be primary and the organism is immediately effected eith-
er pleasantly or unpleasantly by its environment in a
spontaneous fashion.
Ladd and Woodworth recognize four great classes
of human experiences which are characterized by their
A third characteristic of emotional experience
1. I p. 185-186
(i
emotional content. (l) the sensuous feelings, or those
which are dependently related to, and in consciousness
blended with, the different qualities and intensities of
the sensations of the more general organic functions;
(3) the intellectual feelings, or those which precede,
accompany, or follow the various activities of discrimin-
ation, association, judgment, reasoning, and, indeed,
all the forms of functioning of the 'mind' in the nar-
rower meaning of the latter word; (3) aesthetic feelings,
or those which belong to the perception and appreciation
of what we call • the beautiful* (in its various forms)
,
or its opposite; and (4) the moral feelings, or those
affective experiences which appertain to the good and
the bad, in human conduct. To these might be added a
fifth class, to be called the religious feelings, were
it not for the fact that the latter may be satisfactorily
treated as special forms of the combination of the in-
tellectual, aesthetic, and moral feelings." 1
2
James talks about the coarser emotions like
fear and rage and the finer emotions like the aesthetic,
3
moral and religious. Calkins uses the term aesthetic
emotions and Woodworth^ lists the higher emotions as the
5
aesthetic, social, and religious. Ribot deals with the
social and moral feelings and the religious and aesthetic
1. XIII p. 513
2. IX
3. I p. 303
4. XXVII p. 135
5. XXI p. 375f
cI
I
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sentiments. Probably all of these authors mean the 3ame
as Ladd and Woodworth in using these terms. In other
words there are no distinct emotions which may be isolated
and called religious, aesthetic, etc. but there are
definite affective responses connected with religious,
aesthetic and moral experiences. The most convenient way
of designating such affective states is through the terms,
moral emotion, aesthetic emotion, etc. It is well to
rememker, however, that in using such classifications
we are dealing with complex phenomena and that the senses,
the intellect and the will enter into all these affective
experiences. Rigid classification is rather more appar-
ent than real and is convenient rather than actual.
The discussion thus far has tended tc justify
the classification of the emotions as a distinct realm of
human experience. There is such a realm, related very
closely to the cognitive side of the self and yet dis-
tinct from it. It is the affective or feeling aspect
of the mental life. Individual in the extreme, it re-
lates all objective experience to the self in terms of
pleasantness and unpleasantness. It is receptive and
spontaneous. We proceed to the atterr.pt to discover the
psychological processes which function in these emotional
experiences.
rc
Chapter II
Physiology
The Physiological Accompaniments of Emotion
The almost countless theories that have been
advanced as physiological explanations of emotion are
mute testimony to the confusion which obtains in this
field. The facts are that it is almost impossible to
attain assured results when we are studying the physio-
logy of the emotions. It is not difficult to see why
this is so. In the case of sensation and perception we
have external end-organs which are easily observed and
direct reactions can be noted. No such direct testimony
is available for the affect side of life. In their very
nature the feelings are obscure, indefinite and yet ex-
tremely variable and multiform. They are so closely con-
nected to our sensations and ideas as to make absolute
sepatation impossible and yet they are distinct enough
to be treated separately. As far as we are able to de-
termine the physiological conditions are laid in inter-
nal, rapid and infinitely varied changes within the cen-
tral organs, such as cannot be observed directly or sub-
jected to the most satisfactory experimentation. There
are some observable reactions connected with affective
states but since these are only part of the total state
no complete theory can be built upon them alone. However,
we can only record such manifestations as we are able to
observe and try tc project a theory from them.
One of the most evident facts in connection
c
with the emotions, as has been brought out, is that they
are to a large degree automatic. They resemble the re-
flex in this respect since the affective tone appears
without any conscious direction on our part. Now conduct
which is not thought out before hand and which is auto-
matic in nature is usually described as instinctive. In
danger we have an inherent tendency to run. If insulted
we may immediately strike. If a child falls, we pick
it up automatically. But in these cases there is also
a feeling tone present. We fear or become angry or are
sympathetic respectively. The first of these manifesta-
tions are instinctive or automatic, the latter are emo-
tion. That there is a close relationship between emo-
tion and instinct is evident and if it were possible to
explain emotion as the affective side of instinct our
physiological solution would be easily secured.
Indeed McDougall has made an approach to this
solution. In his "Social Psychology"^" he recognizes two
types of emotions. The primary ones are the affective
sides of instincts and the complex emotions are those
which appear as combinations when two or more instincts
are operative simultaneously. The emotion of fear
would be the affective side of the instinct of fear
and the emotion of scorn would be the affective side of
a combination of the instincts of anger and disgust.
Later developments of this author add. a third class, the
derived or new emotions. Joy, sorrow, confidence and
1. XV p. 20
f
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hope would be illustrative. They are neither primary
emotions nor are they blends. Emotions of this class
are not constantly correlated with any one impulse or
tendency but may arise in the course of the operation
of any impulse or tendency. They are more versatile
in nature.
While these three classifications, in a rough
way, at least, probably cover the large majority of af-
fective states and bring out the close connection be-
tween instinct and emotion, they leave much to be de-
sired. McDougall himself, in his third classification
of the derived or new emotions, shows the inadequacy of
the instinct as a complete explanation of affect. As
we shall later see, emotion involves internal responses
also, whereas instinctive action is directed outward
and involves action on external objects. Again emotion
is in the nature of a preparatory reaction while instinct
i3 an end reaction.^"
A very little reflection shows us that in-
stincts and emotions are not identical or invariably
associated. We may step out of the way of an oncoming
car absolutely instinctively and yet betray no fear
whatever. A fly may light on our cheek - we brush it
off instinctively with no particular emotional accompan-
iments - but if the fly returns several times the emo-
tions begin to be aroused. We shall do well to keep
the connection between emotion and instinct in mind but
we cannot conscientiously explain emotion in toto as
1. XXVII p. 134

the effective side of instinct. This finding i3 heart-
ily in accord with modern behaviorism which is trying to
do away with the instincts altogether and which holds
both instincts and emotions to be complex and learned
reactions.*
'But there are other .ays of demonstrating
the presence of emotion which bring to light very def-
inite physiological accompaniments. Emotional expres-
sion is very commonly known and recognized. It appears
in the attitude of the body, distortion of the face,
modulation of the voice and in various gestures. Smil-
ing, scowling, pouting, sneering, dancing and shouting
are examples. All of these reactions are observable
constantly and we know thc.t they bespeak more or les3
active emotional states within the individual. It might
be possible that the affective tone or side of such
bodily expressions would account for emotion. Indeed a
part of the James-Lange theory of the emotions (which
we will consider later) i9 based on this assumption.
However, it is obvious that many of these expressions
may be present without any emotion. Some actors can
and do assume them all without a tr-ice of emotion.
Someone records the statement of a Shakespearian actor
who stabs himself in the last scene. The effect pro-
duced was most realistic and apparently all the emotions
accompanying the act were present. However, on the oc-
casion of the last presentation of the season, the actor,
as he portrayed this realistic scene, muttered to the
1. XVI p. 42f

leading lady, "I die for the 186th and last time this
season". Certainly the appropriate emotions were not
present though the bodily expressions indicated them
to be so.
It must be admitted, of course, thrt the actor
represents a professional type of reaction and hence,
may not be representative. He is trained to artifici-
ally produce all the external manifestations of emotion
whether the actual emotion be present or not. However,
most of us are aware of the fact that the common reac-
tion is somewhat similar to that of the actor. We say
we, "force a smile", or "put on a bold front", even
though the inward emotions are not present. Here,
through reflexes, we probably do actually elicit the
corresponding emotion to a limited degree. Neverthe-
less the emotion so aroused is not nearly so strong as
the spontaneous errotion which would actually cause the
same outward expressions without any conscious effort
on our part.
Darwin1 made investigations in this field
and came to the conclusion that these emotional expres-
sions in man are relics of his animal past. They resemble
the adaptive behavior of the lower animals. This would
link ther very closely to the instincts. There is an
element of learned behavior in them for certain expres-
sions have become associated with different instincts
in the course of evolution and much modification has
taken place. This explanation does not, of course,

aocount for the emotions which seem to accompany such
bodily expressions. It sirr.ply throws the problem back
on the instincts again and shows we must account for
both instincts and emotion. Perhaps these outward bodily
expressions are related to the organic expressions which
have been discovered as operative in emotional behav-
ior and which we will now consider.
These organic expressions, that have been
studied very thoroughly recently, seem at first to give
a new plausibility to those theories of the emotions
which make the feelings the affective side of bodily
expressions both organic and peripheral. Cannon^",
2
Wundt , Bain and others have made extensive reaeardhes
and have discovered very noticable organic reactions
accompanying emotional states. Some kinds of the ob-
servation of bodily functions in connection with the
feelings have been the following: The movements of the
chest and perhaps also of the abdomen in breathing have
been recorded, by the aid of pneumography; and the rela-
tion of different feelings to changes in the rate and
depth of respiration has been studied in the graphic
records. The pulse has been recorded by sphygmographs
applied to various arteries, among which the radial is
the most accessible, though the carotid, since it sup-
plies the brain, has appeared to many investigators as
the most important for psychological purposes. Changes
1. II
2. XIII p. 506

in the volume of the arm, or of a finger - changes which
are due to the varying amount of blood contained in the
member, and which depend partly on the output of the
heart and partly on the vasomotor condition of the mem-
ber and of other p: rts - have been deemed specially
important by many authorities, and have been recoreded
by means of plethysmograph3. Similar instruments can
even be applied to the brain itself, in cases where part
of it has been exposed through removal of a portion of
the skull.
^
2Cannon has done a most remarkable and thorough
piece of work in studying internal changes and has dis-
covered many significant facts. He began by observing
the effects of certain strong emotions like rage upon
the body. A dog was fed in the laboratory and all pos-
sible arrangements were made to see that normal and
pleasant conditions prevailed. The digestive processes
proceeded in normal fashion until a cat was introduced.
The dog became excited and angry. Soon the digestive
processes ceased to function and remained inactive for
several minutes after the cat had been removed. Other
experiments showed that certain emotions effected the
pancreatic juice, the bile and the peristaltic action
of the intestines. This convinced Cannon that all the
means of bringing about chemical changes in food may be
stopped under certain emotional situations. He says,
1. XIII p. 506
«t
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"The conditions favorable to proper digestion are wholly
abolished when unpleasant feelings such as vexation and
worry and anxiety, or great emotions such as anger and
fear, are allowed to prevail".^" In addition to these
changes it was found that certain emotional conditions
caused an increased pulse rate, dilation of the pupil,
sweating and changes in body chemistry. These latter
changes are explained as resulting from the excessive
secretion of adrenalin in the adrenal glands. When
this substance is produced, glycogen, a starchy, fuel
substance is stored in the liver and then transported
rapidly to the muscles to produce new tissue and reduce
fatigue. The thyroid glands of the neck also function
in emotion supplying either greater or less stimulus
to the brain.
It is the belief of psychologists now, due
to the findings of physiological experimentation, th&t
the nerves concerned in these organic changes are found
in the autonomic system. The autonomic system is dis-
tinct 16ut not wholly separate from the central nervous
system. It consists of outgoing axons from centers in
the cord and medulla. However, these nerves reaching
out from the brain or cord never come into direct con-
tact with the gland or smooth muscle cells involved in
organic reactions. There are always interposed between
theccerebro-spinal neurones and the viscera extra neu-
rones whose bodies and processes lie wholly outside the
1. II p. 9

central nervous system. It is thought that these bodies
may act as transformers and modify the impulses received
from the central system.
There are three divisions to the autonomic
nervous system. The upper division or cranial makes its
ultimate connection in the medulla and seems to favor
the processes contributing to digestion. The middle
division or sympathetic system connects to the central
section of the cord. It has to do with the checking of
digestion, hastening of the heartbeat, stimulation of
the adrenal glands etc. The lower or sacral division
makes its connection at the lower end of the cord and is
active in the bladder, rectum and sex organs. The whole
autonomic system is thus indirectly connected with the
higher centers while yet retaining a degree of independ-
ent action. It is to be noted that the sympathetic div-
ision is antagonistic to the sacral and cranial divi-
sions of the autonomic nerve tract. When it functions
in oertain emotional situations it may totally stifle
the other two divisions.
It is comparatively easy to recognize in the
above mentioned organic reactions automatic preparatory
measures to meet the different situations which confront
the organism. Just as bodily expressions in emotion
represent preparatory measures for protection etc. , so
organic reactions make preperation for conflict, flight,
etc. The adrenalin which is thrown into the blood with
the emotion of rage, prepares the organism for fighting
and protects against fatigue. The question is whether
t4
or not the emotions are the affective side of these or-
ganic changes. If we can show that each emotion is
characterized by certain organic changes which remain
constant, we have advanced a long way toward establish-
ing a physiological background for the affective states.
James and Lange worked on this basis in pre-
senting their theory. James recognized two aspects of
emotion, behavior and feeling. The former he called in-
stinctive and the latter emotion. His theory was that
the instinctive reaction does not end with the contrac-
tion of the voluntary muscles but that a visceral or
organic overflow took place also. When the emotional
situation is presented there are the outward bodily ex-
pressions (laughing, scowling, etc.) and the inward or
organic expressions of the autonomic system (changes in
digestion, respiration, glandular action, etc.) which
take place. The subject feels all these changes and this
produces the affect. The more complex emotions, James
thought, might have their affects ingrained in the very
nature of the presentation itself and to borrow nothing
from the reverberations surging up from below the brain.
A number of attempts have been made to classify
the emotions and their various accompanying organic re-
actions. Wundt tried to formulate a law covering this
material. He believed that the various emotional states
had characteristic pulse and breathing foundations. It
is commonly thought that pleasantness is characterized
by a slow strong pulse, dilating arteries and bodily
warmth. Unpleasantness shows a fast, weak pulse and
94
bodily chill. Breathing characteristics under the two
conditions are not so well established. If experimenta-
tion could only establish invariable and distinct or-
ganic states for each emotion, then the James-Lange
th*ory would be pretty firmly extablished. The feel-
ing side of those states would constitute the emotion.
Unfortunately no such distinct states can be postulated.
Cannon found that any high degree of excite-
ment in the central nervous system, whether felt as an-
ger, terror, pain, anxiety, joy, grief or deep disgust
was likely to break over the threshold of the sympathetic
division and disturb the functions of all the organs
which that division enervates. Hence, as Cannon says,
"If various strong emotions can thus be expressed in the
diffused activities of a single division of the autono-
mic - the division which accelerates the heart, inhibits
the movements of the stomach and intestines, contracts
the blood vessels, erects the hairs, liberates sugar,
and discharges adrenin - it would appear that the bod-
ily conditions which have been assumed, by some psychol-
ogists, to distinguish emotions from one another must be
1
sought for elsewhere than in the viscera." Cannon
urges the suggestion that the visceral changes contri-
bute to an emotional complex a feeling of disturbance
of which we are not usually conscious but that they do
not account for distinct emotions.
If we object that the feeling tone in all such
1. II p. 279

extreme donditions (namely, in terror, anger, grief, etc.)
is quite similar and hence, in accord with the findings,
there are other more conelusive disproofs of the James-
Lange theory that can he advanced. The experiments of
Sherrington^" show that emotional responses occur in
dogs in which practically all the main viscera and the
great bulk of skeletal muscle have been removed from con-
tact with the brain. On the other hand the decorticated
dog and decerebrate cat, though all visceral nerve con-
nections are left intact, only respond to the emotions
of anger. This would indicate thet anger is excited by
rellex reaction or that it may be a developed organic
habit and hence, is sub-cortical but that all other
emotions find their physiological explanation somewhere
in the cortex.
That there is seme connection between bodily
reactions and emotion'* however, can hardly be denied.
It is shown by the fact that Amotions can be produced
at times by reproducing their corresponding bodily states.
Some of the extreme mystics use very artificial means to
bring on their mystic trances, for instance. This com-
pels us to recognize a modicum of truth in the position
of James and Lange. On the other hand, it is evident
that there is no longer any possibility of holding fast
to the James-Lange theory or any other theory which
makes the cortical areas secondary or unnecessary in
emotion. An animal without a brain but with a visceral
1. Cited by II p. 280
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nerve system, does not have affective experiences, ex-
cept anger. An animal with a brain but without a viscer-
al nerve system, does have affective experiences, includ-
ing anger. The only possible conclusion is that the
cortical areas are primary. Genetically this may not
have been so but is at the present stage of human dev-
elopment.
We have now arrived at a very unsatisfactory
position. The indications are that the emotions are
not the affective side of instinct. Neither are they
primarily the affective side of either peripheral or
internal organic behavior. There are, no doubt, rela-
tione here but the emotions cannot strictly be explained
in any of these ways. Hither-to a great many psycholo-
gists have built their theories on these phenomena. If
such theories are no longer valid, then ju^t what sort
of theory is valid?
Perhaps the sensations can be appealed to as
an explanation of our e-oticnal life. As was brought
out in the first section of the paper there is a dis-
tinct difference between sensations and emotions. Sen-
sations are localized, are readily observed and have
end-organs. Emotions are not localized, are observed
with difficulty if at all, and have no known end-organs.
Nevertheless, the feeling which accompanies sensation
is comparable to the feeling of emotion. The feeling of
any particular sensation always accompanies that sensa-
tion but it is recognized as a way in which the mind is
affected. So the affect of emotion is recognized as a

way in which the mind is affected even though the stim-
ulus is not localized as in sensation.
Again, the self in emotion recognizes itself
as affected by environmental factors even as it does
in sensation. It is receptive, as sensation is, even
though it cannot localize the stimulus.
These similarities have led some psychologists
to suppose that a definite relation may be found between
the degree and, possibly, the duration of physical stim-
ulation and affective experience. The suggestion is
that any stimulus of great intensity and many stimuli of
prolonged duration occasion unpleasantness, whereas stim-
uli of medium intensity bring about pleasantness, and
very faint stimuli may excite indifferent experiences
depending on circumstances. However, this is not a true
statement of the facts. Beth moderate and strong stim-
uli which are unpleasant may be prolonged until we be-
come indifferent to them. Workers in a boiler factory
may become indifferent to the prolonged rattle of the
riveter. Of course, this may be explained through fat-
igue of the end-organs. But the pleasantness and un-
pleasantness of sensational experiences depends not only
on the factors of unexpectedness, intensity or intermit-
tance. The condition of the subject and his relation
to the experience involved may also vary the affective
reaction. Thus, just as it is impossible to find cer-
tain organic reactions which are always the same for
the same emotions so we cannot suppose there are certain
types of stimuli which always h=.ve the same affective or

emotional tone. There is hardly any justification for
such a term as specific emotional stimuli in the sense
that we speak of specific sensational stimuli. Neither
can we suppose that the emotions have end-organs or that
sensory brain cells connected directly by afferent nerves
to the periphery are excited in emotion.
With this theory of the emotions discredited
we approach the suggested explanation of Miss Calkins.
She recognizes that we are driven to the brain areas
for the basis of our physiological explanation. Class-
ing her position as a composite of those of Wundt, Flech-
sig, and Marshall she finds the cause of pleasantness
and unpleasantness in the excitation of fresh or fati-
gued cells in the frontal lobes of the brain. The fron-
tal lobe is excited by way of neurones from the Rolandic
area. More than adequate reaction brings pleasantness,
less than adequate reaction brings unpleasantness and
equal reaction brings indifference. The way the fron-
tal lobe excitation is brought about according to thi3
theory, is interesting but throws it open to the same
objection as that launched against the James-Lange ex-
planation. The continuity follows: (l) Stimulus (2)
excitations in sense centers, (3) these spread to motor
neurones in the Rolandic area, (4) downward motor neu-
rones are excited (5) the peripheral and organic expres-
sions and changes take pl:ce (6) excitation of end-organs
of pressure by the above physiological changes (7) the
1. I. J. 310
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upward spread of these excitations to the sense-cells
of the Rolandic area (8) the spread of these excitations
to the frontal lobe. The excitation here will be pleas-
ant, unpleasant or indifferent according as the organic
conditions aroused by the stimulus have nourished or
failed to nourish the frontal lobe cells.
This is a very ingenious theory and is perha.ps
a good guess among many guesses ( for they are all that
to a degree) but it seems to have one fatal defect. The
frontal lobe excitations which are responsible for the
feeling content do not result until the incoming neu-
rones have in turn been excited by organic and peripher-
al reaction. Sherrington's experiments using dogs with
brains but without viscera and skeletal muscle explode
this theory as they do that of James and Lange. The
brain areas alone seem sufficient to produce emotionl
If the original Rolandic excitation ((3) above) were
connected directly across to the frontal lobes as well
as indirectly through the fiecera, then we might have
a more stable theory. In thie case the frontal lobe
would be excited and emotion produced regardless of
organic responses and yet if these responses were pre-
sent, they could reinforce the direct transfer across
to the frontal lobes and cause the emotion to be more
pronounced. The diagramatic representation would
be: (See next page)
The arc X is the added connection. The Calkins
theory does not include this.
(<
37
n
o
•H
O
s
w
4*
O
€>
<W
<
(0
e
09 b0
CO d
<D cd
d
09 O
g>.
•H rH
O «H
d O
0,0
o
CD d
> o
-H -H
+> +»
0] Cd
Lh £O -H
O b0
09 Cd
co S
d
O
rH
cd -P
3 ft
CO <D
-H O
> M
CO
V »
rH
<d
4* <D
d .QO O
M rH
CO
o
-Hd
PS
oj
iH
O
* ffS
\
CO
rH
rH
Cd 4>
<0 O
U I
cd <v
m
d
-to
X
d
cd
rH
O
H 09
Cd <0
rH
f3 oH 0Q
o a
d x^
cd
w
u
o
i
•d
d
cd
,io- ^ -co
/
CO
d
CO
to
09 <0
4»
n d
CO
,4
cd cd
rH 4=
rH cd
2 hO
<d d
<D O3 rH
.Q
. O
/ N
U
cd co
4» q>
d rH
3 O
CO
S
09
§
M
O
•A
d
w
\f>- ^
—CD
cd*
cd
4»
H 4)
Q«,0
-H OOH
O
o
< -
cd
d
4»
0)
_ 1
4»
O
CO
•i—>
,Q
o
1
CO CO
V
o
d
o
o
4
<
The above addition perhaps makes this theory
as desirable as any. There are almost countless theo-
ries, old and new, which might be reviewed. However,
Ladd and Woodworth present a position which seems to
meet the most requirements for plausibility.
This theory aims to account for the very com-
plex nautre of the emotions in the individual and for
the wide variation in emotions in different individuals.
This element of variation in emotion is very evident.
Individuals differ to a far greater extent in emotional
reactions than they do in sensational responses. The
same objective stimulus will ordinarily convey very sim-
ilar sensations to various individuals. In emotion this
is not the case. Every subject will have different feel-
ing responses although the same stimulus is applied.
Sometimes the emotional responses to the same situation
will be practically opposite in two different individuals.
Our authors conclude then, that, "This fact suggests that
our feelings are determined by the changeable relations
of the neural processes to the constitution, previous
habits and temporary mood of the nervous system, and by
the relat ons of each neural process to all the others
within the central system, in a more irregular way than
are our sensations and our knowledge." Sensations are
regular and dependable, feelings irregular and unpre-
dictable. The complex nature of emotion suggests that
it is related to the whole experience and state of the
being yet experiments prove it to be very largely cor-
1. XIII p. 533
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tical. On the other hand, organic and expressive changes
in the organism seem to make some contribution when they
are allowed to function.
The theory which Ladd and Woodworth propound
to meet these facts follows. They hold that over and
above the regular and more or less uniform sensational
reactions which follow a peripheral stimulus, there is
a surplus of neural action occasioned in the brain cen-
ters. The general character of this surplus would de-
pend on what the whole nervous system was, on its present
state, and on what it had been recently doing. It would
also depend on how the various new stimulations, running
into the brain center, fit in with this current nervous
state and with one another. These physiological processes
have an affective, feeling side and this constitutes the
emotions.
We should have to add to this theory a sug-
gestion that the stimulus which results in the emotion
need not always be peripheral. Through imagination or
thought an internal stimulus might be supplied. However,
the processes here would be the same. A surplus of ner-
vous action would be occasioned and its affective side
would constitute the emotion. The affect area of the
brain would probably be the sense centers in the Rolan-
dic section though this cannot of course be determined
by experimentation. We may draw this ccnelusion from
the fact that emotional affect ( as far as the brain
centers as concerned) seems very similar to sensation
affect.
(
The question arises as to how tenable this
theory may be. Comparison and test seems to bear out
its completeness. By bringing the total neural condi-
tion of the individual into consideration, we have pro-
vision made for variable reactions in those individuals
and also an explanation of why different individuals
react differently to the same emotional situation.
The experiments which made the James-Lange
theory and other organic theories of the emotions un-
tenable do not nullify this one. If the viscera and
skeletal muscles are disconnected, then the neural
prooesses which remain in the other areas and in the
cortex continue to function and they produce the emo-
tions. On the other hand, if the organic and peripheral
reactions are allowed free expression, they make a con-
tribution to the total neural state and hence, probably
heighten and emphasize the emotion.
The place of sensations, of intellectual ele-
ments and of previous training, is accounted for through
influences on the neural system. If MecCurdy wishes to
give the subconscious a large place in conditioning emo-
tions, it can be done readily here. The flow up from
the subconscious would enter the mental stream and ef-
fect in varying ways the surplus of neural energy. These
physiological processes would register in the same fash-
ion as the conscious processes. Centrally aroused emo-
tions (those resulting from imagination and cognition)
would also effect the nerual reaction and so make pos-
sible an affective tone. The vagueness of the emotional

experience and difficulty of localization is explained
by the fact that no one stimulus determines the emo-
tional state. It results from a fusion of all neural
elements and each makes its impress. The appreciative
and evaluational functions of the emotions would nat-
urally relate stimuli to the whole organism, which fits
in with our physiological theory. It would seem that
there are no psychological or physiological phenomena
which cannot be oriented quite readily to this concep-
tion of emotional life.
Another point of interest here is the compat-
ibility of this theory with the new Geetalt psychology
and its eo-called configurations. The total situation
and its configuration would correspond in a way to the
total situation or coherence psychology of Ladd and
Woodworth.
In conclusion it is well to recognize again
the difficulty of attaining certainty in any theory of
the emotions which might be presented. The difficulties
in the way of direct experimentation especially in the
cortical areas make absolute proof of supposed reactions
impossible and throw us back on theory and inference.
However, we are not content to rest in absolute uncer-
tainty and under these oircumstances the above theory
is accepted as being the mo3t reasonable and in apparent
accord with the majority of the facts.

Part II
The Emotions and Religious Experience

Chapter I
The General Appreciative Function of Emotion.
With a more or leas adequate physiological
theory of the emotions before us, we proceed to a some-
what more practical phase of our problem. If we are to
determine the value of emotional experience in religion,
we must discover certain faots about the emotions. "What
function do the emotions serve?" "What is their purpose
and relation to the organism?" "What is their value?"
This is a day of biological psychology and of
extreme emphasis on physiology as a wholesome reaction
to the unscientific rationalistic psychology of the
past. The new psychology would say that the emotions
serve the organism in much the same way as the sensa-
tions. They warn in case of danger and satisfy in help-
ful situations.
That the emotions, on certain levels at least,
are of a preparatory nature is shown by the facts of or-
ganic change in extreme affective states such as rage
and fear. Here the ductless glands are brought into
play to prevent fatigue and to give added muscular en-
ergy. The reasoning which sustains the above position
runs somewhat as follows. The basic elements of emo-
tion are considered to be pleasantness and unpleasantness
or, by some, restlessness and quiescence and excitement
and calm. Pleasantness, quiescence and calm would con-
stitute that phase of emotion which denoted a satisfac-
tory organic reaction to stimuli, unpleasantness, rest-

lessness and excitement would constitute warning phases.
The parallel with sensational responses is obvious.
Pleasure and pain serve the same function. The pain
aroused by sensation as one touches a hot stove causes
the defensive withdrawal of the hand. In the case of
emotion the unpleasantness, restlessness and excitement
(elements of the affect of fear) at the seeing of a
rattle snake would cause withdrawal or flight.
This explanation of the function of emotion
is reasonable and in accord with many of the facts.
However, it does not take a great deal of reflection
to note that such simple reactions do not cover all
emotional experiences.* For instance, there is the
emotional ecstasy of an aesthetic nature which comes
with the vision of a beautiful sunset. Again, there
are moral experiences which bring a high degree of emo-
tional pleasure. To cite an instnace of still greater
complexity, we may turn to religion with its accompany-
ing emotional states of a very pronounoed nature. All
of these complex affective states cannot be dismissed
with a wave of the biological baton. When we have fin-
ished with an explanation of the biological function
of emotion we must press on to an evaluation of the
higher ends served by man's affective nature. We be-
lieve one of these higher ends it serves is found in
religion.
It is not our purpose to include the moral
1. XXVI p. 12
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and aesthetic functions of emotion except as they enter
into religious experience. There is, of course, no
distinctly religious emotion any more than there is a
distinct religious instinct. Religious emotion is like
any other errotion biologically, expept that it is a-
roused by what we term a religious situation. Often
times religious emotion is a combination of many emo-
tions all operating simultaneously. It is well to re-
cognize this at the beginning as well as to note the
difficulty of isolating completely the emotional nature
itself.
1
Traditionally the mental life has been con-
sidered to have three aspects. These have been called
cognitive, affective and volitional. Lately the vol-
itional element has undergone revision in some minds.
It is seen that volition has, and can have, no content
whatever unless either affect or cognition have sup-
plied it. Hence, will is being identified with the self,
which is considered volitional, and the mental life has
been divided into cognition and affect or interpretative
and appreciative elements. Whichever classification is
used, it must be recognized that no such arbitrary di-
vision actually exists. The arrangement is more logical
than actual and serves us for study purposes only. In
mental experience all the elements are woven closely
together in most situations and help and reinforce one
another. Thus as we study the emotions and religion it
1. XXII p. 3

will "be seen from time to time that cognitive and vol-
itional elements often creep in. They will be accounted
for and related to the emotions as occasion arises.
We face again, now, the problem raised above.
The question might well be phrased, "What are the high-
er functions of emotion?" This question we follow with
another, "What is the function of emotion in religion?"
These two questions will be considered in the order
given.
First, the higher functions of the emotions
in general. On the highest levels of human conscious-
ness we have a very complex situation with which to
deal.* The will has begun to function as has also the
interpretative and affective life and stimuli do not
result in immediate reactions. The mental processes
operate and often delay the response to any particular
situation. The thinking aspects are active, that they
may serve volition and, what is just as important, the
simple affective states of pleasantness and unpleasant-
ness are developed into a system of values which also
serves the volitional life in a supplementary capacity
to thinking.
Why are we justified in giving the affective
or emotional elements of life, which in their simplest
state manifest themselves as pleasantness or unpleas-
antness, so large a place in fuamishing the material
for cognition? The answer lies just here - the cogni-
tive or thinking phase of mental life would not func-
1. XI p. 176f
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tion unless it had something worth while to think about.
The emotions furnish this worth while content. The
array of objective phenomena which constantly impress
stimuli upon our senses would not be considered by the
cognitive functions if they were not first evaluated and
made meaningful to us as individuals. The emotions -
pleasantness and unpleasantness, and their complex dev-
elopments, tell us where the stimuli are favorable
(valuable) to us or not. Evaluation is not an intel-
lectual process alone. Value attracts or appeals in-
teresting us; it is pleasant or unpleasant to us and
it is the affective tone which determines this attrac-
tion. In other words, our affective nature determines
our appreciation of a situation. Association and even
rudimentary cognition are, of course, also present. It
is impossible to absolutely isolate one aspect of the
mental life such as the affective experience, but we
must recognize feeling as at least a primary element
here. As one author say3
,
"Feeling is as basic a men-
tal process as thinking, and furnishes the motive not
only for overt reaction, but for all of the intellec-
tual processes as well".^ Cognition takes the evalua-
ted affective material and usee it in interpretation.
The physiological phase of our study has
shown us how inevitable it is that our emotions should
3
serve in this appreciative cspacity. Our emotions are
1. IV p. 85
3. See I p. 218

individualizing and relate all stimuli to the self in
an appreciative way. They are responsive or receptive
and make us sensitive to our environment so we may ap-
praise its value. Lastly they are automatic in immed-
iately evaluating every situation. The emotional life,
in its very nature, is tuned up for appreciative func-
tions.
The important contribution which emotion makes
to life is readily illustrated with a mathematical pro-
position. Take the simple sum 34-2=4. I see this and
it has no particular emotional effect. It is a simple
proposition and I am absolutely neutral emotionally to
it. But supposing a man borrows 3 dollars from me at
two separate times and then, when he comes to pay me
back, tries to say that the 3+3-3. The proposition
2+ 3=. 4 immediately begins to have a high feeling con-
tent for me. The new interest is accounted for by a
new evaluation of the proposition to the self. We do
not suggest that the abstract proposition becomes the
interest but what it represents does have a new meaning
for us. My intellect and volition begins to operate at
once because of this new appreciative appraisal. Thus,
it is that the emotions function in every phase of life
to give it meaning. The beautiful sunset, the service
of worship, the noble moral character, all appeal to
me because they effect my life emotionally and are so
evaluated. As Valentine observes,"1" it is our feelings
1. XXVI p. 135

that give life ite color, "what mollusks we would be
without it". Jastrow says that it is feeling which makes
man "more than a machine"^" and another author character-
izes feeling as "the leaven of personality". Without
feeling, man would become an automaton, operating like
a spring actuated mechanical toy; he could be likened
to a cold, calculating machine.
It follows very naturally that unless an ob-
ject or idea is emotionalized it will have little or no
value for us and hence, will not attract. The higher
function cf the emotions now becomes plain. Religion,
morality and ethical idealism must be regarded as values
and be filled with emotional content before they will
become directive in life. "The development of an ideal
is both an emotional and an intellectual process, but
the emotional element is by far the most important.
Ideals that lack emotional coloring are simply intell-
ectual propositions and have little directive force
upon conduct.
A brief but direct reference to religion and
emotion may be made here and enlarged upon later. The
idea of God, with its moral and spiritual content, must
sometime be accepted by the complete individual as of
great worth to him. Then will he be able to fill his
full place in social and individual development, by vir-
tue of the new emotionalized value. And let it be clear-
1. XI p. 310
2. Quoted by XXVI p. 87
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ly understood that as long as the idea of God and the
religious possessions of a man are only considered ob-
jectively, as cold intellectual propositions, there will
be no power in them, no more than in the abstract propo-
sition 2 4-3-4.
There are yet other contributions which af-
fective experience makes to life and indirectly to re-
ligion.
(1) Emotional attitudes give direction to
attention. They determine our interests, religious or
otherwise. When much material is presented and assim-
ilated our emotions also serve as focal points around
which this material can be oriented. They help crystal-
lize our beliefs, ideals and faiths.
(2) Emotion furnishes the driving power for
much of our behavior. This is so much the case that
some have erroneously identified motive with emotion.
As Jastrow points out, emotion moves us to action.
^
The psychological theory of dynamogenesis holds that
all ideas tend to express themselves in action. A sim-
ilar theory might be propounded as regards our affective
life. Our feelings are filled with driving power and
tend to cause us to act. One author says, "Our emotions
3
are forces, and we have to study them as such." An-
other remarks, "The feelings both deliver mind from
being merely a clear, cold logic engine, and furnish
1. XI p. Ill
2. XXII p. 1
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the motive force which drives the engine."
(3) Emotion has a subjective value in that
it contributes directly to personal happiness. Our
happiness depends on our level of appreciation. We
must have a unity between the intellectual, emotional
and volitional elements of consciousness subjectively
and a unity between ourselves, society and God objec-
tively. This unity and harmony cannot be brought about
unless the emotional element is present.
(4) Lastly, emotion and appreciation, which
have been developed properly, insure a broad minded,
liberal, complete individual. The qualification, "which
have been properly developed" is very important here.
The rankest reactionism may be highly emotionalized also
but if the higher type of experience is ever attained
and cleaved to eagerly it will be because emotion has
made its appreciation possible. The values of life
which are noblest and highest may be shut off entirely
from that individual in whom the appreciative faculty
does not function. The narrow, small, and penurious
individuals are those in whom the appreciative and
emotional content, as far as the higher values are con-
cerned, is sadly lacking.
It is readily seen how these contributions
of emotion concern the religious life. The direct con-
nections will be pointed out in the divisions presented
later in the paper.
1. IV p. 89
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Perhaps a word of warning against an over emo-
tionalism may be in order sinoe we have been emphasizing
the value of the emotions so strongly. Here it is that
we become aware of the fact that not only does the in-
tellect need the emotions but also that the emotions
need the intellect. The emotions may give life to the
intellectual machine but the intellect protects the emo-
tional life from doing serious damage as well as often
supplying an interpretation of a situation so the emo-
tions can function. The emotions of fear, anger and
hate, for instance, may prove disastrous to the indi-
vidual if he does not allow them to be directed by his
intellectual life. This is not so true of the finer
emotions like sympathy or joy or grief, of course, but
even in these, the intellect functions in an interpre-
tative fashion before the emotion makes its appreciation
and the affective tone results. In short, the emotions
and the intellect are entwined inextricably together and
function simultaneously to the advantage of each other.
Beaause there is danger in a scientific age like ours
of stressing the intellect disproportionately, we are
attempting in this paper to appraise the true value of
the appreciative side of the mental life especially
in the realm of religion.
Quite often it is customary to classify the
emotions and sentiments on the basis of the kind of
problems presented. Intellectual emotions would be
those aroused by questions of logical truth; aesthetic
emotions are those aroused on a question of beauty;
<
moral emotions those functioning on a question of good-
ness and religious emotions those coming to light in
religious experiences and contacts with God. It is
this latter type of appreciative life that we intend to
treat more fully in the rest of the paper. We will
deal, in order, with the value of religious emotions
in conversion, worship and mysticism.
It will be noted that we deal with the emotions
and sentiments together under the term emotion. As we
have qualified the terra emotion it is perfectly legiti-
mate to do this. No one would maintain that the emo-
tions which are feeling and feeling alone operate with-
out stimulus or content. There is always some idea-
tional content. Ordinarily sentiment is the term used
to express the complexes and emotional tendencies which
cluster around certain ideas and which are more or less
enduring. However, the emotional life in its complete
and comprehensive scope covers the whole ground and it
is in this sense that we will use the term emotion.
«
Chapter II
The place of the Emotions in Religious Conversion
Before beginning our study of the emotions
as they manifest themselves in the various phases of
the religious life, it may be well to attempt to form-
ulate a working definition of religion. We are at onoe
faced with a difficulty that is most pressing. The def-
initions of religion which have been propounded are
legion. Some are psychological, some theological and
all have flaws. We must guard against theological def-
initions - those which define religion as a system of
beliefs - for it is with the psychic nature of religion
that we are concerned.
But there are difficulties to be met even in
psychological definitions because of the diversity pre-
sent. There are those whr have defined religion in
terms of intellect. Max Muller writes, for instance,
"Religion is a mental faculty or disposition, which . .
. . enables man to apprehend the Infinite under dif-
ferent names and under varying disguises." Again rel-
igion has been defined in terms cf emotion and the fam-
ous definition of Schliermacher comes to mind. "The
essence of the religious emotions consists in the feel-
ing of absolute .dependence." Rudolf Otto1 makes the
emotions the basis of his conception of religion also.
Finally religion has been defined in terms of will.
1. XVIII

Kant held that, "religion is the recognition of all
duties as divine commands 11 , and hence, the will atti-
tude determined man's aeligious attitude. It is most
obvious that there is no. agreement even in psycholog-
ical definitions.^"
Probably the proper conception of religion
lies somewhere between these three above notions. Rel-
igion involves the whole of the mental life and a proper
balance must be attained in it. Religion involves
some relationship to higher supernatural powers. It
is comprehensive. Professor Pratt's definition might
serve. He says, "Religion is the serious and social
attitude of individuals or communities toward the power
or powers which they conceive as having ultimate Con-
's
trol over their interests and destinies". It might be
well to add that there are certain more or less common
elements in the above conception of controlling power
which are found at practically all levels of religious
life. According to Strickland these are, "(l) super-
human power, (2) goodness or beneficence, (3) the ele-
ment of mystery which is common to all spiritual or
superhuman beings, and (4) the idea of control or det-
1. See IV p. 1 f
VII p. 48 f
XXIV p. 45 f
XXV p. 1 f
III p. 59 f
3. XX p. 2
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ermination in some way of the destinies of the lives
of men."^" The ideational content of religion becomes
much more sophisticated among an advanced people but
Pratt's definition and the four above mentioned basic
elements will suffice for a general statement of even
the advanced idea of religion with which we are to deal.
We proceed now, to a consideration of conver-
sion, especially as it manifests emotional elements.
There is some necessity, in the first pl-ce, of clear-
ing up the idea of Christian conversion. It too, is
variously defined. One author says it is "the exper-
ience of entering the Christian life" and recognizes a
"Christian life" as one which is dominated and control-
led by Christian ideals and a recognition of God the
Father. Another writer says, "The distinctive thing
about religious conversion is that it involves the re-
3lation of the human being to the Divine Being". We
might say, in general, that conversion is the experience
of the dawning of the God consciousness. It is a sort
of "new birth" when the life seems to find a new pur-
pose and goal in the person of God and is definitely
committed to the religious ideal.
It is true thst the word conversion is not
always used in this sense. Because the experience is
confined quite largely to the adolescent period and has
1. XXIV p. 46
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so many accompaniments, it is considered by many to be
a social experience rather than a religious one; Coe
stresses this social element and Pratt also considers
the term conversion in a pretty comprehensive fashion.
He believes, . that the great task of the adolescent
is to grow out of thinghood into selfhood", and says,
".
. the essential element in conversion is nothing else
than this new birth. Now there is no doubt but that
the social element and the growth into selfhood are e3-
esntial elements in conversion but they are not all
there is to religious conversion. In the religious type
of experience, the new social growth in the individual
takes place but also the individual is related very
definitely to God and the religious ideal. No doubt
every adolescent's experience is conversion in one sense.
That is, he experiences a tremendous growth and new
birth and new orientation to his environment. However,
if God and religion are not a part of the accepted en-
vironment, the conversion is not a religious one and we
have no dealings with it here.
As was brought out before, adolescence seems
to be the "flowering time of conversion". It is true
that some few conversions occur earlier and some later
than the adolescent period but they are the exception
rather than the rule. However, regardless of the time
when the experience comes, it is a time of "new birth"
and new orientation to God and the religious ideal.
1. XX p. 123
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There is a new dawning of responsibility and a new real-
ization and acceptance of valuew. Still another very-
important factor enters in. Conversion is usually pre-
ceded by a period of doubt and stress. Things do not
seem to be in harmony and there is a conscious seeking
out after peace of mind and soul. The various phenomena
of life in this period of stress and doubt cannot be
evaluated and put in their proper places. The indivi-
dual feels "out of place" and is uncertain of his at-
titude toward life and purpose in it.
There is no need of our going into the adol-
escent background of conversion at this time. The psy-
chological factors involved can easily be shown to cause
the stress period. The great development in physical
growth, the increased mental advancement and capacity
for thought, the new power of rational judgment and con-
trol of action, all of these throw the life into a tur-
moil. Another important factor is the enlarged emotion-
al life which makes itself evident at this time. How an
individual could progress through such a period of phys-
ical and psychical change without being thrown into a
ferment would be hard to understand. Life would be
changing so rapidly that a new adjustment to environ-
ment would be absolutely eaimential.
The situation is somewhat different as far as
adult conversion is concerned. The growth of the adol-
escent period has all passed. Maturity has been reach-
ed. It is not physical and psychical growth changes
which cause the usual turmoil before the "new birth".

A new valuation makes the one once accepted, inadequate.
There is, however, a similarity between the turmoil per-
iod of adolescence and maturity. It is the feeling of
"being out of place" in relationship to environment.
One' 8 system of values seem insufficient and there is
a demand for revision. This "out of place" feeling may
be described as a sense of sin or as an experience of
mental and spiritual unrest but, however named, it is
essentially the same in its influence and result.
In somewhat reverse order, than we have given
the two essential elements in religious conversion. They
are, the period of unrest and uncertainty, followed by
the "new birth" or acceptance of a personal God and the
religious ideal. In some cases the conversion experience
seems to be immediate and epochal in character. In
others it is gradual in its development and not nearly so
pronounced. But, in any event, there is a change from
an old to a new attitude toward life. The old becomes
insufficient and is replaced by a new set of values as
a personal God and religious ideal is accepted. With
this data before us we now approach the problem of the
place and value of the emotions in the total experience
of religious conversirn.
If the emotions, as the early part of the paper
demonstrated, perform the appreciative and evaluational
functions of the mental life, their value in religious
experience is at once obvious. The basal change mani-
fested in the "new birth" of conversion is one of new
evaluation. The old becomes inadequate and is replaced

by a new system of value which has come to be appreciat-
ed through emotional experience. Now, some might contend
that there is no reason why this new evaluation cannot
take place through the cognitive processes. Starbuck
says, for instance, "It is significant that girls first
awaken most frequently on the emotional side and least
often to new insights into truth. The boys, on the
contrary, have the emotional awakening least frequently,
but organize their spiritual world most often as a moral
one." He seems to think that most boys have a predom-
inantly intellectual and interpretative experience and
that the emotions play a minor part except among girla.
It is our belief that the so-called intellectual proces-
ses which here function among the boys would never be
brought into play at all unless the affective life had
first functioned. What actually happens is that cogni-
tion begins to interpret the moral experiences after
they have been evaluated by the emotions. The moral
ideals that operate in conversion, the concept of a per-
sonal God, the religious stimuli that are made upon the
individual, are evaluated first by the appreciative
capabilities of the affective life. They are pleasant
to the individual because they are prime factors in a
needed readjustment. Hence, he feels them as valuable.
Then, and then only, are they referred to the cognitive
function for interpretation and judgment. The cognitive
judgment is a secondary one - the experience has already
1. XXIII p. 198

50
been judged valuable by the emotions and is given at-
tention for that reason.
The same process, with an opposite result, is
present in the stress period which may precede conver-
* eion. The stimuli which have heretofore sufficed, be-
come unpleasant to the affective life. Hence, they are
felt to be disvalues and the seeking for a new orienta-
tion takes place. These " felt disvalues" may then be
referred to the cognitive life and there, through inter-
pretation, be judged to be intellectual disvalues also.
The essential thing is that it is the affective exper-
ience which is primary and directive here regardless of
what intellectual elements may be brought into play in
a regulative capacity later.
The individualizing and spontaneous elements
in emotion go far to explain the above processesl The
religious or moral stimulus is given. At once, auto-
matically, the self begins to feel deeply and these
feelings are related to the self. It reports in con-
sciousness that the stimulus is pleasant (valuable) or
unpleasant (disvaluable) to the self and, having served
this appreciative function, the intellect and will are
free to do with the report what they will. How impor-
tant the emotions are in thie regard is seen when we
• recognize that, unless they react to the stimuli in a
forceful way, those stimuli would never be given out
attention in cognition and volition.
This leads us to take up from the standpoint
of religion the four other contributions which we found

the emotions made to life. The first has already been
discussed in brief. It .is, the power of emotion to
direct our attention. The affective life determines
our interests in this way, whether they be religious
of otherwise. Omr affects interest us in things. Once
our interest has been aroused and judgments formed, then
our emotions give us stability and serve as focal points
for future experience. Thus, we see how dependent any
religious interest is upon the affective side of life.
Religious conversion comes because of a new interest in
God and religious ideals and it will not come without
this interest. Conversion continues to exert influence
in life if our sentiments are aroused and formed ade-
quately. These sentiments will not be aroused unless
there is emotional content. The emotions determine in-
terest and sentiment and, through them to a degree, the
experience of conversion.
Another distinct service which the affective
life renders to religious conversion, lies in its ability
to furnish driving power for much of our behavior. As
we have pointed out, emotion moves to action. The feel-
ings are forces and in this regard approach the volition-
al phase of the self. They tend to prompt behavior and
to express themselves in actions. They will not permit
us to lie dormant when stimuli are impressing themselves
on the end-organs. It is readily seen how this tendency
of emotion would at least facilitate religious conver-
1. See p. 39-40 above

eion. When the religious stimuli are present, they are
evaluated and, if found valuable, the impulsive power
of affect drives ue to want to accept the religious
ideal. It is very doubtful if pure intellect would
ever move any individual to accept religion. The most
logical arguments for God and the religious ideal might
be propounded and accepted but reason does not have the
compelling power possessed by feeling. Affect drives
the individual to accept the stimuli as true. This
probably accounts for the tremendous strength of reli-
gious conviction and loyalty found in many subjects who
have had a very dramatic and emotional conversion. Men
like Wesley and Bunyan got their driving power largely
from emotion. On the other hand, predominantly intel-
lectualistic and critical churches and theologies, like
the Unitarian, for example, are comparatively sterile
in sheer religious fervor. Thi3 does not mean that they
are necessarily sterile emotionally in other lines of
activity. For instance, Unitarianism has been tremen-
dously emotionalized about higher education and bib-
lical criticism. But because their emotions do not
direct them toward piety we may say their religious
fervor is weak.
We may consider, now, two practical values
which the emotions contribute to life through religious
experience. First, they bring personal happiness. Our
happiness depends on our level of appreciation. When
we have accepted religion as a personal possession then
our level of appreciation is heightened and life made

more radiant. Again the emotions insure a complete in-
dividual, broadminded and properly developed, by making
religion available. Thus, a whole new realm of noble
experience is opened up which would otherwise be a hid-
den book.
These latter two practical contributions are
not the least of the many values which we have seen the
emotions bring through religious experience. Religion
and morality are the highest values of life. No per-
sonality can be said to be complete which does not ap-
preciate them. When this Kingdom of values has become
a personal possession there is a radiance, purpose and
poise to life that can come in no other wayl In making
this possession possible through religious experience
the emotions serve in the noblest possible capacity.

Chapter III
The Emotions and Religious Worship
It is not our intent here to deal with the
worship experience in a historical way. It is not nec-
essary that we should do so. The essential principles
of worship can be presented and our conclusions drawn
from them. Nothing whatever would be gained by tracing
the various manifestations of worship from primitive
times until the present. Some authors seem to feel that
if they can deal with the subject from the standpoint
of primitive life they have solved all the problems that
arise in connection with it. This accounts for the mass
of almost gruesome material which usually faces us in
such discussions. Now it is true that the investiga-
tions incident to such findings are important and nec-
essary in a study of the history of religion but that
is beyond the province of this paper. We take the find-
ings of the historian - deduce certain general principles
that may be found in all types of worship - and then re-
late the emotional life to them. It is safe to say
that
,
though the technique of worship has varied among
.
all people and all ages, the basic principles are the
same and so provide us with a good working foundation.
What, than, is religious worship? One author
has defined it as, "any exercise through which man feels
that he comes into a special relation with his divinity."
1. VII p. 346

Another says worship means, "approaching or seeking
relations with the Divine".^" Some hold worship to be
a group activity only and would so define it as a,
"group of persons trying to get into relationship with
God". The latter writers would differentiate between
worship and prayer also, at least between worship and
private prayer. It is doubtful, however, if such a
division is either necessary or actual. We may have
private and public worship, group or individual worship,
private and public prayer and group and individual pra-
yer, yet all may be called attempts to come into con-
tact with the Divine and in this sense are identical in
purpose. Worship tries to bring Divine contacts; pra-
yer is Divine communion and, as such, is a part of and
the fruition of wotship. There are technical differen-
ces in the objective activities in all of these cases
to be sure, but the attitude is similar and for the
purpose of our present discussion we will class them
as one.
It would appear then that worbhip is the pro-
cess through which man approaches and communes with what
he considers the Divine forces of the world. In the
case of the Christian religion, worship means an approach
to, and communion with, God. That this God must be con-
sidered a personal God goes almost without saying. It
is true that some students do not admit this but it is
1. XXIV p. 179
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difficult to see how any other position can be true.
For instance, an old University of Nebraska professor
of mine defines prayer as, "ritual observance designed
to bring man into nearer relation with the unseen powers
of nature?.^" But what man prays to or worships the,
"powers of nature", as inanimate forces? The crude an-
thropomorphisms of primitive people show how impossible
surh an abstract attitude is. Always there is the trans-
formation of the unseen forces into terms of human per-
sonality. Otto says, "It is essential to every theis-
tic conception of God, and most of all to the Christian,
that it designates and precisely characterizes Deity by
the attributes Spirit, Reason, Purpose, Good Will, Sup-
reme Power, Unity, Selfhood. The nature of God is thus
thought of by analogy with our human nature of reason
and personality ..." This statement is well in ac-
cord with that of Professor Strickland who finds that
the idea of God at all levels includes certain opmraon
elements. These are, (1) superhuman power and wisdom,
(2) goodness, in the sense of being favorable to man,
(3) mystery and (4) the idea of ability to determine, in
3
some degree, the fortunes and destinies of man. Only
a personal being could encompass such demands. Thus,
worship is the process of coming into contact and com-
munion with a God conceived as personal in nature.
1. VI Vol. X "Prayer"
3. XVIII p. 3
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If this conception of worship be true, it is
obvious at once that an emotional judgment, or act of
appreciation, has to be made before worship can ever
begin. This is not true of the mechanics of worship,
of course. Mechanically worship may be engaged in at
any time but true personal communion, which is the true
act of worship, is dependent on an emotional judgment
of value. This explains our purpose in dealing with
religious conversion before we take up the experiences
of worship and mysticism. One who has never made an
evaluation of God and accepted the religious way of life
will never worship. This puts the whole emotional con-
tent of religious conversion behind worship and makes it
necessary for it. Rudolf Otto says a significant thing
as be begins the third chapter of his "Idea of the Holy".
Hi6 words follow, "The reader is invited to direct his
mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious experience, as
little as possible qualified by other forms of con-
sciousness. Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no
such moments in his experience, is requested to read no
further; ..." This writer knew that those without
the experience could not understand. In the same fash-
ion, those who have not experienced God as a pleasant
(in the noblest sense) emotion and so evaluated Him as
indispensible to life, need not consider the matter of
worship. Indeed they will have no desire to do so. Why
should they worship that which they do not value? The
1. XVIII p. 8
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emotions become the foundation of worship, then, for the
value judgment concerning God can come only through
them.
If a value judgment ( based on the human affec-
tive life as appreciative judgements are) is necessary
as a foundation for religious worship, it is no less
necessary for the continuation of worship. "People con-
tinue to practice the cult (of worship he means) not only
because society insists and because they believe their
God is pleased by it, but also because they find it
pleasant or profitable or both, in its immediate effect
upon themselves."^" No better proof of the necessity of
emotion as an explanation for worship could be asked or
given. The emotions are pleasant and unpleasant
,
etc.,
in their simplest elements. Those stimuli which are
pleasant we hold to be valuable. Once this apprecia-
tive function is served we think and act accordingly.
In the case cited by Pratt, our emotions in worship are
pleasant. Hence, worship is regarded as valuable and
is participated in accordingly. If the emotions do not
serve their appreciative function and record the exper-
ience of worship as pleasant and valuable, men will not
worship. This makes it appear that both the beginning
and continuance of worship are dependent on the emo-
tions for their driving power. Men do not worship be-
cause it seems logically reasonable to worship. They
worship because their feelings tell them that it is
1. XX p. 371

reasonable and desirable (volitional urge) to do so.
Though perhaps Hickman did not intend it so, his defi-
nition of worship brings out the above proper emphasis
upon the emotions. He says, as recorded above, "wor-
ship is any exercise through which #an feels (the under-
lining is mine) that he comes into a special relation
with his divinity."
It has been stated above that man continues
to worship because he feels he is benefited thereby. If
this is so, he must realize that God is a greater and
mightier being than he and is capable of helping him.
No doubt this is one of the fundamental attitudes of man
in worship and it is preceded by a feeling of man's own
smallness and insignificance. As a man beset by thugs
might run to others for aid, so a man beset by a feel-
ing of his own weakness might go to God for companion-
ship and strength. This feeling of weakness and inade-
quacy is called the "creature feeling" by Otto and it
finds its explanation in the emotional life of man. It
is his affective nature which first warns him that all
is not well. There is a feeling of uneasiness and lack
of peace which is unpleasant. He begins then to seek
that environment which will replace unpleasantness with
pleasantness and turmoil with peace. Through worship
and communion with God he finds that a new peace oomes.
The great power and security of God brings him indivi-
dual power and security. The miracle is wrought.
Thenceforth, he attempts constantly to be in contact
with this new found strengthening power. He cannot
c(
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maintain it constantly, he finds, but when he is perform-
ing the acts of worship he feels his greatest satisfac-
tions. Worship results, then, partly from the "creature
feeling" of man. And we must keep firmly in mind the
fact that it is a "oreature feeling " . Worship appears
rational to the religious man, it is true, but ration-
alization of feeling content has made the intellectual
position possible. What he feels precedes what he
thinks about worship.
Psychology will not permit us to actually
divorce these two experiences absolutely as this state-
ment would indicate. As has been pointed out before,
the various mental processes are so closely woven toge-
ther as to be practically simultaneous but the feeling
element, which assures us worship* is pleasant, does have
a precedence here even though it probably oould not be
measured by any man made machine.
In the above mentioned "feeling of dependence"
there is perhaps a partial explanation of the fact that
worship so often takes the form of group activity. The
social bond is everywhere evident in man's doings. Men
study, hunt, travel and live together. This association
comes, no doubt, because man finds comfort and assurance
in the fellowship of his fellows. He feels more sure of
victory in his undertakings and more confident when num-
bers are present. May this tendency not be an explana-
tion of a part of the satisfaction of group worship?
When an individual enters a church, there to come into
communion with his God, it is comforting to find maay

of his fellows there with the same intent. Joining with
them in worship brings oonfidence and assurance that God
will hear his prayer. Who has not felt the sway and
lift of the devotional spirit in a company of worship-
pers repeating the Lord's Prayer together? Probably not
the least value of creeds is the conviction which comes
from hearing them repeated by a great mass of men. Yet
none of this feeling of content in the religious social
group can be attributed to the cognitive activity. It
is something more primal than that which strikes these
spiritual assurances into a man's soul. The affective
life supplies this content and conviction. Social wor-
ship is highly dependent upon it.
There are two other elements, quite common in
worship, which bfcing out the importance of the human
•motions. The first is the "feeling for the sublime"
or tendency to idealize a world which is nobler than
this; a tendency quite common to the religious indivi-
dual. He has seen visions of a higher and more perfect
sphere, itself a creation of his mind, (the values of
which have been supplied by his emotions) and he feels
cramped and handicapped in this present realm. The
desire oomes at times for his soul to be freed from its
earthly prison that it may find expansion and power in
the more glorious ideal world. This ideal world is
built up as a result of a feeling of dissatisfaction
with this world and a feeling pf higher values that
hcB come through religious experience. Now in the ex-
perience of worship the straining individual finds a
r4
compensation for the limitations of the terrestrial
sphere. Communion with God opens the door of spiritual
opportunity to the restrained life. There is no dis-
tinction of persons before God. Rich and poor, educated
and unlearned, stand before Him, alike. All material
limitations are dispelled and the idealistic fight to
the throne of God is achieved. Probably not all types
of worshippers have the same intense idealizing exper-
ience as is here described but it is undeniable that
the tendency may be found in all worship. There is
little need to point out that these reactions are all
manifestations of our emotional or affective life and,
as such, increase the dependence of worship on the ap-
preciative function.
The second element of the worship experience
which we wish to mention here has to do with man's sen-
sitivity to the aesthetic. It is pretty well establish-
ed that our aesthetic nature is dependent upon the emo-
tions. It is the feeling of beauty or lack of beauty
that determines our aesthetic reactions. Aesthetic stim-
uli are pleasant or unpleasant and hence, beautiful or
ugly. What this may have to do with worship is another
question. Perhaps it his nothing whatever to do with
it. On the other hand, there are man$r indications that
there is a direct connection between the aesthetic ap-
peal and the experience of worship. A simple question
or two may bring out this connection. Is it easier to
worship in beautiful surroundings than in ugly ones?
Why not hr.ve church in a bare board building? Why in-

stall expensive organs in the temples of worship and
have elaborate music? Why have attractive religious
symbols in our sanctuaries?
The suggestion is obvious. Most of us find
it easier to worship in an atmosphere which is aesthet-
ically pleasing. Of course, contrary oases can be cited.
The Quakers seem to prefer simplicity and yet no one
would depreciate their spiritual attainments. Indivi-
dual cases can be cited of men with no aesthetic appre-
ciation who, nevertheless, lived in spiritual ecstacy.^
But this is apt to be the exception rather than the rule.
Beauty of environment usually adds to worship apprecia-
tion. It is true that there is indefinite proof here
of emotional reinforcement. However, with our findings
thus far indicating that the emotions play a very large
part in worship and with our knowledge of the dependence
of the aesthetic life on the emotions assured, we may
safely conclude that it is natural for aesthetic appre-
ciation to reinforce the experience of worship. We may
also conclude that this reinforcement takes place be-
cause of the similarity of the two experiences.
It would appear from these findings that just
as the emotions play a primary part in the experience
of conversion, so they play a fundamental part in the
experience of worshipl Indeed we may say that without
the appreciative function, worship would neither develop
or be continued.
1. See VII p. 356, 362
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Chapter IV
The Emotions and Mysticism
We have now dealt with the emotions as they
affect the best known and most common forms of religious
experience. There is another phase of the religious
life called the mystical, which should be given at least
a degree of attention. Here again we are not dealing
with the subject critically. We accept the facts as
they are recorded in personal experiences and then at-
tempt to determine the value of the emotional element
in them. Whether mysticism is objective or subjective,
real or illusory, is none of our concern now. We deal
with what seem to be.
All authors seem to realize the difficulty
faced in defining the word mysticism. It has been used
in multiform ways. Coe* gives a liete of various hist-
oric usages and a reading of this reoord only increases
the general confusion. There is "mild mysticism" and
grand mysticism", "normal mysticism" and"abnormal
mysticism"; in fact, there is no end of varieties of
the experience. With these facts in mind, we will pre-
sent a few definitions which seem to get at the heart
of the matter as well as it can be done. Jones says
mysticism is the, "type of religion which puts the em-
phasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on
direct and intimatd consciousness of the Divine Pre-
1. Ill p. 363

sence. It is religion in its most acute, intense, and
living stage. "^ Another author says, "In the mo3t gen-
eral sense the mystical type of religious experience
is that in which the subject believes he is in immedi-
p
ate touch with the divine." Pratt is quite explicit,
saying, B I propose . . that . . mysticism be defined
as the sense of the presence of a being or reality
through other means than the ordinary perceptive pro-
cesses or the reason. It is the sense or feeling; of
this presence, not the belief in it, and is not the
result of sight or hearing or touch, nor is it a con-
clusion one reaches by thought; it is, instead, an im-
3
mediate and intuitive experience."
It is evident, from these definitions, that
mysticism has a relationship to worship and prayer but
that it goes beyond them in both certainty and content.
The object of the experience is the same, of course. It
is a personal Divine Being which is experienced but the
relationship is more immediate and forceful. Those who
have made any attempt to give the content of a mystical
experience have been sure of one thing and one alone.
There has been an immediate flash of insight in which
they have been momentarily lifted into the very presence
of God. Their physical senses have not born this test-
imony. It is some sort of inner feeling that brings
1. XII p. XV
2. XXIV p. 248
3. XX p. 337
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the conviction.
James says that the experience has four char-
acteristics. It is ineffible (cannot be described read-
ily) , noetic (gives deep insight and knowledge without
cognition) , transient (cannot be sustained for long) and
passive (the subjects own will is in abeyance). The
particular phase of mysticism with which we are concern-
ed is the feeling element or what James calls the noe-
tic. It is to be noted that practioally all students
of the subject acknowledge mysticism to be primarily a
feeling or affective state. It is not reason that
brings the assurance of immediate divine presnnce, it
is a sort of inner intuition. Yet that the experience
is real, cannot be doubted for there are almost count-
less cases of testimony as to its reality. The effect
which the experience has upon the subject is another
testimony to its actuality. The subject is sometimes
lifted into a great ecstasy and when the experience is
faded there is a desire to have it return. This be-
cause the brilliant nearness to God and contact with
the higher realm has brought great peace and joy.
The conviction which the mystic shows is a-
nother factor to be noted. Many contend that they are
more sure of the spiritual realities experienced in the
mystic state than they are of physical realities recog-
nized as being brought to them through the senses. In
extreme mysticism the body is forgotten. There is no
1. X p. 380-381

realization of sense stimulation at all. The soul seems
freed from the physical body and seems to have an im-
mediate and independent contact with the Divine which is
felt to be very real. It is obvious that the mystic is
dependent upon the same sense impressions for his ex-
perience as is any other individual. What really hap-
pens is that the emotions give such a convincing proof
of the worth of the experience that the senses are for-
gotten. The mystic is made so oertain of reality by
his emotions that he forgets the vehicles through which
he gets his oontent.
Whatever else we may say of the mystic exper-
ience, it is evident that affect plays a very large
part in it. It is emotion, feeling, which gives the
reality sanse. This being so, we must recognize that
without emotion the aystic state would be impossible,
even as worship that was vital and warm, would not be
possible without it. No realm of religion is quite so
dependent on emotion as is that of the mystic.
The one question which must be answered in
this connection is concerned *ith the feeling of real-
ity. Can the emotional life provide it? It seems to
have an intellectual or cognitive content. If it is
cognition which makes mysticism possible, then emotion
has no large place in it. Perhaps we had better recog-
nize here that there are two kinds of rationality. The
one is mediated through the logic of ideas and symbols,
the other depends upon ingight into the meaning of the
same ideas and symbols of a direct and immediate kind.
c
This latter type would be operating in mysticism, as is
evident. But some might not acknowledge it as rational-
ity at all and, strictly speaking, it is not convention-
al rationality. May we not call it a higher rationality,
recognizing, of course, that it is not technical ration-
ality at all but above it? It is more immediate in its
results than conventional cognition. It is more sure
and eertain of its results - they are most 'real, though
less easily described. Why, then, should we not call
it a higher rationality? It is the rationality of feel-
ing and emotion. It comes when the emotional nature
reacts so favorably and pleasantly that there is im-
mediate surety of well being. The experience does not
need to be turned over to cognition for verification
and regulation. It is so desirable to the emotions as
to carry its own proof.
Such rationality - that based on feeling and
immediacy - might be called affect-rationality. The
judgments based on it have been called value judgments
and are recognized as playing an important part in rel-
igious experience. They give the feeling of worth and
in the case of mysticism they manifest a relationship
in which the subject is in immediate contact with real-
ity.
(
Summary
Part I
Chapter I The human self has emotional aspects as well
as those of cognition and will. These emotional phases
of experience may be reduced to the elementary feelings
of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Affect is individ-
ualizing in nature; it is receptive and may be aroused
by either personal or impersonal objeots and, finally,
it is spontaneous, being almost instinctive in nature.
We may speak of intellectual, moral, aesthetic or reli-
gious emotions depending on the type of situation which
arouses them. Altogether we must recognize the emo-
tions as constituting a distinct and important aspect
of mental life.
Chapter II In propounding a physiological theory of the
emotions, one is handicapped by the difficulties of ob-
servation and experimentation in the field. One pos-
sible theory is that the emotions are the affective
side of instinct. McDougall sponsors this position.
It is untenable, however, for instincts and their sup-
posed accompanying emotions are not identical or invar-
iably associated. The outward bodily expressions such
as frowning, smiling, etc. , do not account for emotion
for they can be indulged in without the affective state
being generated.
One quite plausible explanation ofi the affec-
tive life is that it is the feeling side of certain or-
ganic reactions such as increased heart beat, endocrine
(
activity etc. Much experimentation has been done along
this line and it is very obvious that there is a close
connection between emotion and organic activity. The
autonomic nervous system controls these activities. The
James-Lange theory of the emotions holds to the above
thesis. However, when an attempt is made to classify
the affective states which accompany certain types of
organic reactions some difficulties are met. Often
times different emotions follow practically the same
organio reactions. Also Sherrington has found that emo-
tional responses occur in dogs when the visceral and
skeletal muscle has been disconnected. This makes it
appear that the cortical areas are primary in affect.
The supposition that the sensations can be ap-
pealed to as an explanation of our emotional life is un-
tenable when a complete study is made. Objective stim-
uli do not always arouse the same affect as they do in
the case of sensations.
Miss Calkins theory of the emotions gives a
primary place to the cortical areas although the funda-
mental initiation of feeling is grounded in the organic
proc esses as is the case with the James-Lange theory.
Sherrington's experiments discredit this position. If,
however, Miss Calkins will give the cortical areas a
place in initiating emotion there is little fault that
can be found with the theory.
The Ladd and Woodworth physiological theory
presents the most plausible explanation of the emotion-
al aspect of experience. It accounts for the very com-
r
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plex nature of affect and gives the corticsl areas their
proper emphasis. The theory follows:
Over and above the regular and more or less
uniform sensational reactions which follow a peripheral
stimulus, there is a surplus of neural action occasion-
ed in the brain centers. The general character of this
surplus would depend on what the whole nervous system
was, on its present state, and on what it had been re-
cently doing. It would also depend on how the various
new stimulations, running into the brain center, fit in
with this current nervous state and with one another.
These physiological processes have an affective, feel-
ing side and this constitutes the emotions.
This position seems to stand comparison with
the other theories that have been propounded and wit&
the facts. It includes all of value in other explana-
tions and also some necessary approaches not elsewhere
found.
Part II
Chapter I The function of the emotion o£ the lower planes
is preparatory. Feeling prepares the organism for cer-
tain types of reaction. But there are higher planes of
feeling experience, namely, aesthetic, moral and reli-
gious. In general we may say the higher function of emo-
tion is appreciative and evaluational. The feelings
valuate stimuli and turn those considered wotth while
over to the cognitive aspects of mental life for inter-
pretation and comparison. The feelings give life its
c
color and make man more than a machine.
If stimuli do not effect the organism pleas-
antly, they will not be considered valuable. Hence,
the emotions direct attention, furnish driving power
(interest), contribute to personal subjective happi-
ness and insure complete individuals. The emotions
should not be emphasized, however, to the complete
discredit of cognition and volition.
Chapter II Religion is defined as, the serious and so-
cial attitude of men toward the personal power or pow-
ers which they conceive as having ultimate control over
their interests and destinies. In conversion we find
individuals, after a period of stress, reorganizing
their lives and showing allegiance to this Divine Pow-
er. This means that they value God and accept him as
a personal possession. The emotions make possible this
new evaluation. The old values are felt as inadequate
^unpleasant) and the new values as adequate (pleasant)
and, hence, the conversion takes place.
In addition to this function the emotions
serve in directing attention toward God, in furnishing
driving power (desire) for H.is acceptance and in bring-
ing personal happiness through the widened outlook of
the converted individual.
Chapter III Religious worship is any exercise through
which man feels that he comes into a special relation
with his divinity. In the case of the Christian it
means the approach to and communion with God. Now,
the act of worship will never begin unless the bub-
r<
ject values God. This appreciation is made possible
through the human emotional life. The continuation of
worship, once it is "begun, depends also upon the feel-
ing of worth (pleasantness) in the experience. Probab-
ly no individual worships until he has felt his own in-
significance and, by contrast, the greatness and power
of God. This is an affective experience and prompts
him to seek God for help. Otto calls it the " creature
feeling " . What man feels precedes what he thinks about
worship. The close relationship of the aesthetic ex-
perience to worship also stresses the value of emotion
in this regard. The aesthetic experience is an affec-
tive experience. Beauty aids worship. We conclude
from this that worship may also be largely dependent
upon emotion.
Chapter IV Mysticism is the sense of the presence of a
being or reality through other means than the ordinary
perceptive processes or the reason. It is the sense
of feeling of this presence, not the belief in it, and
is not the result of sight or hearing or touch, nor is
it a conclusion one rraches by thought; it is, instead,
an immediate and intuitive experience. Thus, it is
seen, that mysticism has a relationship to worship but
that it goes beyond it. In mysticism there is an im-
mediate flash of insight in which the subject is lift-
ed momentarily into the very presence of God. The phys'
ical senses do net give this testimony. It is some
thing felt . Usually the experience is one of great
certainty. What we have in mysticism then, is a value
(
judgment in its purest state. It is practically all
emotion that enters into the immediate state of ecstasy.
We may call the mystic experience one of a higher ra-
tionality - the rationality of pure feeling.
f
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